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Keller reached Heidelberg in the fall of 1848, where Spinoza's teaching was interpreted for him by Hermann Hettner, and where the fairly materialistic atmosphere of such men as Moleschott, Henle, and Kapp enveloped him. All of these influences, however were welded into one when he came under the sway of Ludwig Feuerbach.

Feuerbach had started out as a follower of the Hegelian speculative philosophy, but in the thirties had come out with his own, quite anti-Hegelian doctrine of naturalism. From the mazes of subjectivism, a return to nature. The senses take the place of the abstract egoistic starting point. In this you will note he is in accord with modern psychology; nothing in consciousness which was not before in the senses; and in accord with modern metaphysics, which asserts that the theory of knowledge is prerequisite to all philosophy. But the theory of knowledge since the days of Kant and Hume has shown a decided tendency to begin and to end with psychology. And psychology bases upon sensation. Feuerbach has, then, the thoroly modern conception, altho we may not say that he makes psychology the arbiter in the theory of knowledge.

Here, then, is a return to that doctrine of the full living out of the personality, to that Hellenic joy in sense, with emphasis on the present moment, which characterized the classic period of German literature. This is the natural reaction of an age of natural science and psychology against the subjective philosophy which had dominated German thought for two generations.

After romantic spiritualism the spiral is returning to that *Sinnenfreudigkeit,* and that humanism, at which Goethe, by dint of a strong and naive personality, had arrived intuitively. This present life is more to these men than the life to come, just as it was to the Greeks.

In Feuerbach there is also the anti-Christian ferment, which, however, is only incidental, not *essential,* to his philosophy, and was useful as an aid in recalling the generation from the abstract and supermundane to themselves. Man should, says Feuerbach, have the motive of his doing, the objects of his thought, and the

panacea for his evils and sufferings, not outside of himself, like the heathen, nor above and beyond himself, like the Christian, but within himself.[1]

And while the common lexicons set this down as materialism, it was in effect idealism, or at least an idealized materialism, the practical proof of which statement is that the characteristic materialists of the age, for instance Max Stirner, had no keener opponent than our philosopher. Feuerbach was too much of a practical philosopher anyway to trouble much about the question of the substance and the idealistic hypotheses. His emphasis was placed upon human weal and woe, upon the ideal and human conduct. The influence of Feuerbach's teachings in German life and thought has not yet been fully evaluated, but is coming with every year to be more and more so. Indeed his recent exponents, competent authorities in philosophy, assert that the time will come when Wagner and Nietzsche will have to return to its original source much of their glory when Feuerbach again comes into his own.[2] The materialism of the age was thoroly idealized in Feuerbach, and in this Keller followed him.

In discussing Keller's attitude towards tragedy, now, we need to call to mind that his early works tend to end tragically, *e. g., Der grüne Heinrich, Romeo und Julia auf dem Dorfe,* and especially *Theresa,* a dramatic fragment, conceived probably under the influence of Hebbel's *Maria Magdalena.* All of these were conceived not later than 1847 to 1849, and Keller never again wrote a tragic work, or a work with a tragic end, with the exception of *Regina* in the *Sinngedicht,* planned in 1851. And, while we cannot, here, go into the various changes later introduced into these works, I wish merely to state the fact that the tragic in the above mentioned works was either changed to a happy ending, as in the revised edition of *Der grüne Heinrich* and in *Dorotheas Blumenkörbchen* in the *Sieben Legenden,* or remained uncompleted, as *Theresa,* except in the case of *Romeo und Julia,* and *Regina,* where to give up the tragedy would have been to give up the story *Die drei gerechten Kammacher,* which dates from the early period, and which some would count as tragic, is not tragic because the bearers of the action do not possess the qualities of tragic persons.

[1] *Werke,* VIII, 358.

[2] Cf. Fr. Jodl, *Ludwig Feuerbach,* 1904.

Moreover, there are various statements of Keller's which substantiate the fact that he grew more and more averse to tragedy with the years. I will take time to quote just one of them. "Allein Meyer hat eine Schwäche für solche einzelne Brutalitäten und Totschläge," (the work under discussion is *Jürg Jenatsch*) "Wenn er so was hört oder liest, so sagt er: vortrefflich! So hat jeder seinen Zopf!" [3]

I will consider that this point is well enough established, since Bächtold has touched upon it, also, and because it is important only for what lies back of it, namely, his changed view of life, as may be shown as follows:

In Keller's mature view of life there was no place for the future world, either of the Christians, or of the panlogists; nor for pessimism, so prominent in the philosophy and in the theory of tragedy of the period; nor was there any place for fatalistic polytheism nor, incidentally, for the hot-house optimism of such a man as Nietzsche, which may explain Keller's refusal of Nietzschean philosophy. Incidentally I may say that Keller's views on the drama may best be read up in Preitz,[4] although this work is devoid of any philosophical interpretation of the views expressed.

In the first place we know that Keller considered drama the highest form of poetic art. We know also that Keller was no dramatist, but that is not because he had not well-defined views of tragedy but because of the nature of his poetic faculty. I need here to touch only on the salient points and I may add that most of these views were expressed in letters to Hermann Hettner, who considered them significant enough to embody them almost verbally into his work *Das moderne Drama,* Braunschweig, 1852.

As an esthetic means Keller saw no objection to the *fatum* if it did not interfere with clearness and simplicity, Keller's first prerequisites. And thus, while he does not agree with those who, like Herder, thought fate a necessary accessory in the motivation of good tragedy, nor with the modern pessimists who practically approximate this position, he does praise the French classicists who used the *fatum* as a motif "*um ihre kindliche und doch so männliche Naivetät und hauptsächlich um ihre reine Tragik*".[5] The

[3] A. Köster, *Der Briefwechsel zwischen Theodor Storm und Gottfried Keller,* Berlin, 1909, p. 194.

[4] *Kellers dramatische Bestrebungen.* Marburg, 1909.

[5] Bächtold, *Gottfried Kellers Leben,* Berlin, 1895, II, 124.

meaning is clear: the French—he is thinking here especially of Racine—used the *fatum* as a motive but with naivete of mind and clearness of style, and their world is as little troubled by brooding pessimistic theories of fate as was the fair age of Grecian tragedy. And when Keller condemns the predominant use of the *fatum,* as he does, he is thinking of contemporaries who had abused the fatalistic motive, and especially of certain heavy-footed pessimists who were, in Keller's generation, construing a new *fatum* which was far more depressing than the Grecian *fatum* ever thought of being.

We must pause here to remark on the legitimacy of reading a philosophical significance into tragedy at all. Tragedy has generally been considered by the critics a purely esthetic form, and while it might reflect *Weltanschauung,* it should do so only incidentally. But in more recent literature and criticism, *Weltanschauung* has played an important part in tragedy, and the theory of tragedy, and authors and critics have come to claim philosophical significance for the tragedy. As representatives of this view we may instance Schopenhauer, Wagner, and Nietzsche. But even Hebbel comes very close to this view. As to his theory of the drama it is a well-known fact that Hebbel bases on, or coincides with, Solger and Hegel. Now Solger starts from certain ideas of Schelling's in his analysis of tragedy. A passage containing the idea in point is as follows:

"Das Individuum muss Mittel, die Gattung Zweck der Natur erscheinen, das Individuelle untergehen und die Gattung bleiben, wenn es wahr ist, dass die einzelnen Produkte in der Natur als misslungene Versuche das Absolute darzustellen, angesehen werden müssen."[6]

Now this idea that the individual, if necessary, must be sacrificed to the genus is found in Solger, and, later, in Hebbel's dramatic theory, and, as is well known, has been perpetuated in the writings of Schopenhauer. This idea with an admixture of the irrationalism of Schelling's later years forms the basis of Schopenhauer's pessimism. Now we find both these trains of thought entering into Hebbel's theory, for the doctrine of *innere Freiheit bei äuszerer Notwendigkeit* is evident enough in Hebbel, and just as Schelling finally floats over into the mysticism and theosophy

[6] *Werke,* Part I, Vol. III, p. 51.

of Jacob Böhme, and locates the irrational in the Absolute itself: (Out of the absolute, out of the interaction of the *Urtrieb* and reflection (*reflektierender Verstand*) the world is born) so Hebbel calls this *Weltwerdung Gottes,* " *Gottes Sündenfall.*" And thus we arrive at the heart of his theory that evil is situated in the *Weltgrund* itself and the greatest misfortune is to be born. Thus we find, not one or several dramas, but his theory of the drama as well, built upon his view of the world and standing or falling with the acceptance, at least for the time being, of this view by the auditor. I know very well that Hebbel never formulated the proposition in so many words but that is what his acceptance of Hegel's philosophical theory really signifies.

In Schopenhauer and Richard Wagner there comes the outspoken doctrine of the *tragische Weltanschauung* which in the case of Schopenhauer ends in a return to oriental mysticism (Nirwana), but in Wagner takes on the form of *Gegenwartspessimismus* with *Zukunftsoptimismus.* In Nietzsche this fatalistic view finally ends also in a return to mysticism, in the doctrine of *die ewige Wiederkehr.*

Among recent writers Richard Dehmel is on the other side of the question, but he also holds that the drama has a philosophical significance. However, he, as an optimist, or a meliorist, thinks that our age has overcome tragedy, in as far as this represents the *tragische Weltanschauung.*[7]

From the ranks of the critics again we will quote only one, Ernst Lahnstein, who writes: "Das Problem der Tragik ist seinem Wesen nach keine ästhetische, sondern eine Menschheitsfrage. Der Dichter, der im Leben, wie in der Kunst, mit ihm ringt, ist hier—wenn irgend wo—Representant der Menschheit."[8]

And thus we may say that in spite of the old theory that the drama is purely an esthetic form, it has been, and is being, used with a philosophical significance. As a result there has grown up a feeling, as shown in the case of Dehmel, that certain critics and authors have used tragedy to promulgate pessimistic views. This very feeling was shared by Keller in his day.[9] And we think he was right, for the doctrine of *Zukunftsoptimismus* or that other of

[7] R. Dehmel, *Gesammelte Werke,* Berlin, 1909. Vol. 9.
[8] *Das Problem der Tragik in Hebbels Frühzeit.* Berlin, 1909, p. vi.
[9] Cf. Bächtold 2, III.

*die ewige Wiederkehr* is too abstract for the average auditor to grasp. He sees and hears only the pessimism of the *now*.

As to the dramatists themselves, their attitude towards the problem of tragedy may be formulated thus: There are two camps among tragedy writers in modern times. The one has taken the question from the metaphysical side, that is, they have undertaken and are undertaking to probe into the metaphysics of the great problem of the universe. Is this problem soluble? It appears not. In spite of all the tragedies of this sort, the problem of the presence of evil in the *Weltgrund* (which is really the basal question in the problem) is just as enigmatic and as far from solution as it was in Greece, or in Eden for that matter. All that these metaphysical reflections have done, and apparently can do, is, cynically at times, at times stupidly, to bring us face to face with the old sphynx, the dull and sodden and disheartening fact, that we cannot understand the dualism in our universe.

And if you say to me that my conception of this school is shallow, and that their pessimism is really idealism, because, thru the Hegelian thesis-antithesis-synthesis theory, out of the present order of the world there is to come a new order, thru development, and that your pessimist is working at this, then I ask whether humanity can understand such abstruse gospel, and, moreover, whether such abstruse ideas can be represented productively on the stage anyway? I know also that a sort of fierce, primitive conception of religion and history resides in the school of Hebbel and Nietzsche, which may find its full justification in German history of the last 300 years, but I ask: is this the view generally held by Germans? May not salvation be achieved equally thru the idealism of the present age in a new humanism which grows out of this dark northern fatalistic view which has hung like a pall over northern Europe for a generation and more?

The other school has left the metaphysical speculations to the philosophers and has substituted therefor psychological grounds in the philosophical motivation of tragedy. This type prefers to work at problems which can be solved. Their domain is the psychological problem of action and reaction, of cause and effect. And here you recognize at once that we stand upon the ground of modern science. Now we know very well that modern science also rests upon hypotheses, but what scientist bothers about that? Just so the tragic poet need not bother about it. He is, according to his

conception of art, either striving primarily for beauty, or working at problems. And as far as he is working at social and psychological problems he stands upon the ground of modern science. The problems of social action and reaction, cause and effect, can be solved sufficiently accurately for the present, and with the progress of science there lie greater possibilities here. Thus the tragic poet has here the possibility of contributing not only to the esthetic pleasure but to the enlightenment and the betterment of the race.

Keller dislikes a predominant use of chance as a tragic motive, first, because of his desire for clearness and simplicity, and furthermore because its predominant use overemphasizes its place in the government of the world. The question might be formulated thus: Is depending mainly upon chance, in any undertaking, a good progressive policy?

As to the question of tragic guilt, Keller stands half-way between the two schools, one of which never construes tragic guilt for the hero, while the other always does. In this he follows the popular feeling, which, no doubt, has good ground: namely, that the guiltless tragic hero is not the only kind to be found in the world. Take, for instance, Prinz Friedrich von Homburg as a representative of the guilty hero, and on the other side Cyrano de Bergerac, or Dietrich von Bern. And, incidentally, I should like to mention the latter as an example of Christian plot which makes crushing tragedy, since it is claimed that no real tragedy is possible with the Christian view of the world. This is asserted because there is no tragedy for the Christian since the happiness of the Christian heaven awaits him. But how about your *Zukunftsoptimisten;* are they not also hoping for salvation some time, somewhere?

Keller also has examples of tragedy in which no tragic guilt is construed for the tragic persons, namely, in *Romeo und Julia,* and *Regina.* But here there is nothing of the pessimistic, fatalistic. Here we have a psychological tragedy which follows in the steps of Charles Darwin rather than in those of Hegel-Schopenhauer-Nietzsche, for here the guilt lies in the one case with the parents of the tragic persons, in the other with the environment or family connection (*Familienzusammengehörigkeit*).

We come to our conclusion regarding Keller's view of tragedy. In the first place we may say that he, like Goethe, was averse to tragedy, "und hat tragische Situationen lieber vermieden als aufgesucht." Moreover, Keller could not go very far with Hegel-

Solger-Hebbel for the reason that panlogism is not to his way of thinking, and merely asserting his freedom of will against fate and by a free act of the will giving up existence does not avail Keller anything. Nor could he go very far with the Schopenhauer-Nietzsche idea of *tragische Weltanschauung* for the very obvious reason that Keller is a meliorist, and again, the pessimistic ferment of this school availed him nothing, since his art is not for art's sake but for humanity's sake, and he felt that their pessimism was not a progressive human force. That is, as we saw, also Dehmel's attitude, in the work quoted. In its stead Keller substituted "die Hingabe an das rein Menschliche," an active functioning realism which, since it works at present-day tasks, amounts to meliorism, just as Richard Wagner had learned this attitude from Feuerbach, before he finally adopted Schopenhauer as his guide.

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## TWO OTHERWORLD STORIES

Most scholars who have had occasion to deal with the Celtic otherworld story either uphold or assume its independent and unique character.[1] But this position has not passed without challenge: it has been implied, for example, that the Teutonic and especially the Oriental conceptions of the otherworld are almost indistinguishable from the Celtic.[2] The purpose of this study is to determine whether the early Celtic otherworld story can be paralleled by otherworld story from one body of Oriental literature—the *Arabian Nights.*

After carefully searching through the ten volumes of *The Thousand and One Nights* translated by Sir Richard F. Burton,[3]

[1] See, for instance, G. L. Kittredge, "*Sir Orfeo*," *American Journal of Philology*, VII, 188-197; Alfred Nutt, *Studies on the Legend of the Holy Grail*, 230-234; W. H. Schofield, "*The Lays of Graelent and Lanval*," *P. M. L. A.*, XV, 165-171; A. C. L. Brown, *Iwain*, Harvard Studies and Notes, VIII.

[2] See Rose Jeffries Peebles, *The Legend of Longinus*, Bryn Mawr College Monographs, IX, 173.

[3] Published by the Kamashastra Society, Benares, 1885. This study does not include the *Supplementary Nights.*